This article provides an analysis of people smuggling prosecutions in Australia from 2008 to 2011. Based on the available case law, the article develops a profile of 'typical' people smuggling offenders, examines sentencing trends, and analyses the role of smuggled migrants. The article concludes that current prosecutorial and sentencing practice have had no success in deterring people smuggling and develops a number of recommendations for law reform and policy change.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ continue to arrive. If the Commonwealth government intends to continue prosecuting people smugglers despite the new budgetary constraints, it may need to shift its focus toward investigating, extraditing and prosecuting the organisers who have so far largely escaped prosecution, rather than the Indonesian fishermen typically caught operating people smuggling vessels in Australian waters.
B
The legislative framework In Australia, legislation relating to people smuggling is by and large limited to a series of offences in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ('Migration Act') which, since 2002, are duplicated in almost identical form in the Criminal Code (Cth). Section 232A was added to the Migration Act to specifically target persons who organise and facilitate the bringing of groups of undocumented migrants to Australia, particularly by sea. 16 The section created an offence for organising or facilitating the smuggling of five or more persons who do not hold a valid visa to enter Australia as required by s 42(1) of the Migration Act. The offence -and its equivalent today -attracts a maximum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment and a mandatory minimum penalty of five years for first time offenders. 17 If less than five persons are brought into Australia, organisers and facilitators can be prosecuted under s 233(1)(a). 18 Minor amendments aside, these offences remained unchanged for about 10 years until the introduction of the Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth) which sought to strengthen the Commonwealth's anti-people smuggling legislative framework by ensuring that an appropriate range of offences are available to target and deter people smuggling activity … [and putting] in place laws to provide greater deterrence of people smuggling activity. 19 This Act substituted the people smuggling offences in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) with the current sections 233A to 233D. The basic offence of 'people smuggling' is now set out in s 233A of the Migration Act. In addition, the Migration Act also provides for several aggravated offences of people smuggling 20 and criminalises supporting the offence of people smuggling. 21 Penalties for these offences range from imprisonment The old offence of 'organising bringing groups of [5 or more] non-citizens into Australia' under s 232A, was repealed and replaced with a range of new offences including its equivalent, 'the aggravated offence of people smuggling (at least 5 people)' under s 233C. These amendments were intended to restructure the people smuggling offences in the Migration Act to provide greater clarity in the structure of the offences. The new 'aggravated offence of people smuggling (at least 5 people)' under s 233C is merely a remodelling of the old offence under s 232A. The elements of the offence were not changed. 20 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 233B-233C (Aggravated offence of people smuggling (exploitation, or danger of death or serious harm etc); aggravated offence of people smuggling (at least 5 people). 21 Ibid s 233D.
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115 ____________________________________________________________________________________ for 10 years or a AUD110 000 fine or both to imprisonment for 20 years or a AUD220 000 fine or both. A number of these offences contain mandatory minimum sentences and non-parole periods. 22 Further amendments were introduced with the Deterring People Smuggling Act 2011 (Cth) which aims to ensure that people smugglers may not evade a conviction based on arguments that the smuggled migrants they carry or otherwise organise are found to be refugees. 23 The Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth) maintained mandatory minimum sentences for people smuggling offences under the Migration Act and extended their application to a broader range of circumstances under the new offences. Mandatory sentencing was first introduced for people smuggling offences by the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) in response to the perception by politicians and the media that the sentences imposed on those convicted of people smuggling offences were too lenient. This legislative limit on judges' sentencing discretions was motivated by political reasons rather than a genuine belief that the impoverished fishermen who comprise the bulk of convicted people smuggling offenders deserve a minimum of five years' imprisonment with no chance of parole for at least three years, or that such sentences would have a deterrent effect. To this day, people smuggling offences remain the only federal offences with mandatory minimum sentences.
III CASE LAW
The following cases have been selected to illustrate common circumstances from which people smuggling prosecutions arise. These cases, presented in chronological order, are representative of the general characteristics of people smuggling to Australia, and of the prosecution of the Indonesian crewmembers commonly found on board the people smuggling vessels. Because the details of these cases are not known or not readily available to most readers, this article outlines each case in some detail. With one exception, the facts, the personal backgrounds of the offenders, and the sentences imposed are all remarkably similar: the offenders are Indonesian men who come from very poor families, they have only limited education, they were approached by strangers who offered them about 5 million Indonesian rupiah ('IDR') (approximately AUD530) to undertake some work on a boat, and, in most cases, the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed. An exceptional case is that of Mr Hadi Ahmadi, who organised several boats carrying hundreds of passengers to Australia and received a greater sentence than most other offenders. His case is considered below as a useful contrast to the others. 24 
A
Amos Ndolo 1 Background Mr Amos Ndolo, an Indonesian fisherman, was offered a job by an unknown person, to take people from Indonesia to Australia. He accepted the job, undertaking the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 22 Ibid s 236B. 23 Ibid s 228B. 24 Another organiser, Achmad Olong, was among the 43 offenders in the cases studied. His case is not summarised in the descriptive section of this paper, but was considered in analysing the trends emerging from the cases studied, and is mentioned in the analysis below.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ journey in his small wooden fishing boat as captain. There were three crew and fourteen passengers on board. On 6 October 2008 his vessel, later referred to as SIEV 25, was intercepted in Australian waters by the Royal Australian Navy. 25 At that time, Mr Ndolo's boat was taking on water and seemed as though it was about to sink. 26 All of the passengers on board -who had each paid organisers of the journey between USD10 000-12 000 to be taken to Australia -were non-citizens without valid visas to enter Australia. Mr Ndolo was found with IDR3.256 million (approximately AUD350). He claimed the money had been a gift from friends, but it is more probable that it was his payment for accepting the job. 27 Mr Ndolo was charged under former s 232A of the Migration Act. On 3 April 2009 he pleaded guilty in the District Court of Western Australia. 28 2 Sentencing In sentencing Mr Ndolo, O'Brien DCJ considered the application of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by then s 233C of the Migration Act (now s 236B), and understood that the law required her to decide whether Mr Ndolo should receive the minimum sentence or a higher penalty. Taking into account the circumstances of the case, her Honour thought it was likely that the passengers were frightened of sinking, noting the evidence about the journey given by two of the passengers on board Mr Ndolo's boat. She remarked that the vessel was unseaworthy and carried no lifejackets. Her Honour considered that, as captain of his boat, Mr Ndolo played a vital role in unlawfully bringing non-citizens to Australia, and that he had accepted the job because of the money. Referring to the seriousness and prevalence of these offences, O'Brien DCJ also took into account the need for a sentence of general deterrence, and noted that the courts usually consider this to be more important than the personal circumstances of offenders in these cases. 29 Nevertheless, her Honour went on to consider Mr Ndolo's personal circumstances, noting his limited education, and that while he had been able to support his family as a fisherman, he was still very poor. This supported her view that Mr Ndolo was the victim of people smuggling organisers who recruit poor fishermen to transport noncitizens to Australia. O'Brien DCJ also took into account Mr Ndolo's early guilty plea, his cooperation with police, his remorse, and his low risk of reoffending, and decided that he should receive the mandatory minimum. 30 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
B
Mohamed Tahir and Beny 1 Background Messrs Mohamed Tahir and Beny both worked as fishermen in small coastal villages in Indonesia. Both had left school at primary level and were looking for work when they were approached by older men who offered them IDR5 million (approximately AUD530) to take people to Australia. They expected to be caught but did not appreciate of the seriousness of people smuggling offences under Australian law. Mr Beny was told he would be returned to Indonesia after a short time, unaware that in reality he would be gaoled in Australia for at least three years without parole. 31 Messrs Tahir and Beny were taken to a 15 metre wooden fishing boat in Lombok. The vessel, which would be referred to by Australian authorities as SIEV 36, was loaded with 47 passengers, predominantly from Afghanistan, who had each paid the organisers of the journey up to AUD6000 to reach Australia. A captain was also present when the vessel departed, but later left in a smaller boat and instructed Messrs Tahir and Beny to continue on their course to Australia. They did so, taking turns to steer the vessel and to sleep, as well as attend to other duties. 32 On 15 April 2009, SIEV 36 was intercepted in Australian waters approximately twoand-a-half nautical miles southeast of Ashmore Reef. 33 At the time of interception, SIEV 36 had been at sea for about five days and nights since leaving Indonesia. There was sufficient food and water onboard and it was equipped with a compass, but carried only one lifejacket. Messrs Tahir and Beny were both inside the wheelhouse at the helm of SIEV 36. The passengers on board were found to be non-citizens without valid visas authorising their entry into Australia. 34 Throughout the night of 15 April 2009, nine members of the Australian Defence Force ('ADF') were on board SIEV 36. Messrs Tahir and Beny were required to operate the bilge pumps in order to expel excess water from the vessel. On the morning of 16 April 2009, the custody of SIEV 36 was transferred to HMAS Childers. At about 8:00 am an explosion occurred on board the vessel. Of the 47 non-citizens on board, five were killed and most of the rest were injured. Messrs Tahir and Beny were also injured, receiving burns which required lengthy hospitalisation, and left them permanently scarred. Following their discharge from hospital, the two men were arrested. 35 Messrs Tahir and Beny were both charged under former s 232A of the Migration Act. They pleaded guilty and were sentenced in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory on 28 October 2009. Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
There was some confusion about their ages, but bilateral wrist X-rays revealed that they were both about 19 years of age; ibid 3.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ noted that both offenders had expressed remorse and pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, and that they had offered to assist Australian authorities by helping to identify the others who were involved. 36 At the time of sentencing there was no allegation that either of the men were responsible for the explosion, but a later coronial inquest into the deaths of the five passengers who died as a result of the incident found that, although it was other passengers who caused the explosion, either Messrs Beny or Tahir sabotaged the engine by pouring salt into it. 37 Mildren J expressed dissatisfaction with the mandatory minimum sentence, stating that: 'But for the mandatory minimum sentences which I am required to impose, I would have imposed a much lesser sentence than I am now required by law to do'. His Honour commented further that, as a result of the mandatory minimum, principles of parity between offenders have little or no role to play: all offenders that fall within the class of offending which would ordinarily attract a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum will be treated equally no matter what their level of criminality. 38 Mildren J said that in cases of this kind, general deterrence is given primacy. Despite his criticism of mandatory sentencing, he emphasised the importance of Australia's laws against people smuggling, noting the need to protect Australian sovereignty and discourage people smuggling ventures due to the danger they pose to passengers and the risk of disease. 39 Although Mildren J concluded that a lesser sentence was appropriate in all the circumstances, Messrs Tahir and Beny were sentenced to mandatory minimum of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. 40 Noting their offers of assistance to the authorities, and having regard to their ages and circumstances, his Honour said he would recommend to the executive that the defendants be considered for release on licence after serving a period of 12 months if, in fact, they were able to provide any useful assistance to the authorities. 41 
C
Yan Pandu, Daud Mau, Usman Kia, and Titus Loban 1 Background Messrs Yan Pandu, Daud Mau, Usman Kia, and Titus Loban worked in Indonesia as fishermen, farm labourers, or both. They were all from isolated villages on the small island of Sabu, had limited education, and were very poor. Each had been approached by one or more men from a people smuggling organisation to sail on a boat. Mr Pandu was offered IDR1 million (approximately AUD 110), and the others were each offered IDR2 million, but no money was ever paid to them. 42 43 The vessel, later referred to as SIEV 43, arrived at Probolinggo near Surabaya, where passengers of predominantly Afghan origin embarked under cover of darkness. The passengers had paid a substantial amount of money to organisers. Mr Kia said in evidence that he asked Mr Tinus about the passengers and was told that they were going to Rote Island. SIEV 43 left for Rote Island on the night of 15 May 2009. 44 At Rote Island, Mr Tinus left the vessel in a smaller boat after advising Mr Kia to steer SIEV 43 south, saying that he would be picked up in the morning. Mr Kia and the other three crew members followed those instructions. 45 The Royal Australian Navy detected SIEV 43 in Australian waters south of Ashmore Reef in the early hours of 24 May 2009. On board were four crew -Messrs Pandu, Mau, Kia and Loban -and 74 passengers without valid visas to enter Australia. 46 The four crew members were charged under former s 232A of the Migration Act. They pleaded not guilty.
2
Trial The case was heard in the District Court of Western Australia, beginning on 27 April 2010. Each of the accused gave evidence which satisfied the evidentiary burden of raising the defence of duress under s 10.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth). 47 In summing up, Eaton J remarked that:
Each accused has given evidence to the effect that following their decision to turn the SIEV 43 around and return to Rote Island and the actual change in course to that effect, threats were made to the effect that if they did so, they'd be pushed overboard. … In order to avoid being thrown overboard … the boat must, it was said, continue on its journey south. 48 The Crown's argument was that from the beginning of the voyage all four defendants knew the purpose of the voyage and that the destination of the passengers was Australia instead of Rote Island. 49 The Crown referred to evidence from passengers that the crew were using maps to steer the vessel, and that the boarding party led by naval officer Imms also found a map with Ashmore Reef marked on it, indicating that that was the vessel's intended destination. 50 On 17 May 2010 the jury returned guilty verdicts in respect of each of the accused. 
3
Sentencing The four offenders were sentenced on 21 May 2010 on the basis that the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the elements of the offence had been proven and that the defence of duress was not applicable.
The Crown submitted that the operation of which the offenders formed part was well planned, involving the coordinated loading of the 74 passengers near Surabaya. SIEV 43 was relatively well equipped, and the organisers were able to arrange for repairs to the engine to be carried out during the voyage. The Crown did accept that none of the four defendants was involved in that organisation. Nevertheless, their role was central to the entry of the passengers into Australian waters. 51 The Crown submitted that the jury's verdicts were consistent with a finding that the elements of the offence were made out prior to any alleged threat, and that the offenders facilitated from the outset the bringing of the passengers to Australia. The Crown conceded, however, that there were a variety of scenarios consistent with the jury's verdicts and that Eaton J would be bound to sentence on the scenario most favourable to each of the offenders. 52 The Crown further submitted that the prevalence of this type of offending and the risk involved required strong penalties of general deterrence. 53 Eaton J accepted the prevalence of the offending, noting its frequent reporting in the media. But he expressed some misgivings as to the effectiveness of general deterrence when it comes to offending of this type, questioning the extent to which the broader Indonesian population would be aware of the circumstances of the case, and of the consequences for the four men in Australia. 54 In sentencing the four offenders, his Honour said that, on the evidence at trial, he was not satisfied that when they undertook to work on the vessel they each knew that there would be passengers and that those passengers would be bound for Australia. 55 Eaton J also considered that the threatening behaviour attributed to the passengers by the defendants at the time of the attempted return of the vessel to Rote Island was consistent with the behaviour of the passengers described by the boarding party from HMAS Larrakia when SIEV 43 was turned north to return to Ashmore Reef. He took the view that it was likely that the passengers, faced with four unarmed crewmen not complying with their desire to continue southward, may well have behaved in a similar fashion. 56 His Honour was not convinced that the four men knew from the outset the destination of the passengers, or that they worked on the vessel in the first phase of the journey to facilitate the bringing to Australia of those passengers, and so sentenced 
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121 ____________________________________________________________________________________ them on the basis that in all probability they facilitated the bringing to Australia of those passengers, having regard to the fact that they were, in the second phase of the journey, significantly outnumbered by the desperate passengers. 57 He also considered the offenders' personal circumstances, such as their poor education, lack of prior convictions, and lack of sophistication, which were augmented by pleas in mitigation following the jury's verdicts. 58 He noted that the level of culpability of the four offenders was generally comparable, and made no distinction between the sentences to be imposed on each. 59 Despite his misgivings as to the effectiveness of general deterrence in these cases, Eaton J reiterated the seriousness of the offending, and the need for general deterrence. Having regard to the mandatory minimum penalty, he rejected the notion that that the minimum term could only be imposed in cases where there are optimum mitigating circumstances. 60 His Honour also had regard to the factors outlined in s 16A Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ('Crimes Act'), and noted that the governing principle is the imposition of a sentence which is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence, together with the consideration of general deterrence. 61 Accordingly, Eaton J imposed the statutory minimum of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. 
D
Rudi Suwandi 1 Background Mr Rudi Suwandi, a fisherman who, according to court transcripts, lived in a small hut with no electricity in a village on Lombok with his wife and two children, was approached by strangers who offered him IDR5 million (approximately AUD530) to be crew on a vessel. Having accepted the job, he boarded the vessel, but when it came time to leave, the man he thought was to be the captain of the vessel ran away. Mr Suwandi continued the trip because he 'felt sorry' for the 36 passengers on board, being 27 adult males, five adult females and four children from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. 64 The vessel, later referred to as SIEV 157, was intercepted on its way to Australia on 8 June 2010. 65 On board were Mr Suwandi and another crew member. They advised that they were lost and running out of fuel. Sea conditions were rough and Mr _____________________________________________________________________________________ 57 Ibid 10-11. 58 Ibid 11. 59 Ibid 14. 60 Ibid 15. 61 Ibid 16. 62 Ibid. 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Suwandi found the journey frightening. 66 None of the passengers on board held a visa to enter Australia. The vessel was equipped with lifejackets and sufficient food and water. 67 Mr Suwandi was charged with the aggravated offence of people smuggling under s 233C of the Migration Act. He pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory and was sentenced on 18 February 2011. 68 2 Sentencing In sentencing Mr Suwandi, Riley CJ adopted the sentencing principles he previously applied in R v Pot & Ors. 69 This approach involves applying the usual sentencing principles in determining an appropriate sentence in all the circumstances of the offence, and if the appropriate sentence so determined is less than the statutory minimum, the minimum will be imposed as required. 70 His Honour noted that Mr Suwandi was not a principal behind the offending, but nevertheless played a vital role at the end of the chain of persons involved in the people smuggling process. 71 He said that general deterrence was a significant factor in determining an appropriate sentence, noting the seriousness and prevalence of offending of this kind. 72 Riley CJ further noted that Mr Suwandi pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity, and that the Crown had accepted that his plea indicated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice. 73 His Honour considered the circumstances surrounding the offending, including Mr Suwandi's personal situation, and reached the conclusion that a sentence less than the mandatory minimum would be appropriate for him. 74 Riley CJ regarded Mr Suwandi's involvement in the offending as being a member of crew who took no part in organising the journey or arranging the passengers. He had no control over the number of passengers to be transported and it appeared he treated the passengers with consideration. His Honour also noted that Mr Suwandi cooperated with authorities, that he had no criminal history of any kind, and that he would be unlikely to reoffend. 75 Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years was imposed. 76 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 66 Ibid 2. 67 Ibid. Ibid 4-5. 72 Ibid 5. 73 Ibid 3. 74 Ibid 4. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid 5.
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E
Hadi Ahmadi 1 Background Mr Hadi Ahmadi was born into a well-respected family in Iraq where his father was a prominent religious leader, but in 1986, due to persecution under the regime of then President Saddam Hussein, he and his family fled to Iran. His father remained in Iraq and, in 1991, was killed. Mr Ahmadi remained in Iran with the rest of his family until he came to believe that he was not safe there either. In 1999, he applied to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR') to be resettled as a refugee, and, in December 1999, was temporarily resettled in Indonesia. Mr Ahmadi remained in Indonesia for several years. 77 During that time he unsuccessfully attempted to legally migrate to Australia and other countries, as well as making two unsuccessful attempts to illegally enter Australia by boat. Through those attempts he made connections with people smugglers whom he later assisted; in Lombok he first met Mr Sayed Omeid -a senior people smuggler who was also mentioned in the case of R v Olong 78 -and tried, unsuccessfully, to travel to Australia on one of Mr Omeid's boats in 2000. Thereafter Mr Ahmadi became involved with Mr Omeid. 79 Mr 
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ busses for the passengers, being at the shore when the vessel departed and meeting people in Jakarta and receiving money from passengers. 81 In relation to the voyage on board the Conara, which arrived at Christmas Island on 22 August 2001 carrying 364 people, the evidence established that Mr Ahmadi's conduct included being at the shore, meeting people in Bogor, and attending upon passengers with another person operating at his level in the organisation. Mr Massoud Etemadi gave evidence that Mr Ahmadi received money. 82 Mr Ahmadi argued that his actions were purely for altruistic humanitarian purposes and did not amount to facilitation. A number of witnesses, including Mr Ahmadi's sister, gave evidence at trial that he was of good character. 83 On 11 August 2010, after a 10 week trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts in respect of two of the four charges under s 232A of the Migration Act. 84 He was sentenced on 24 September 2010. 85 3 Sentencing Because Mr Ahmadi's offending occurred before the introduction of mandatory sentencing provisions for people smuggling offences, these had no bearing on his sentence. Nevertheless, the Crown made submissions in relation to the seriousness of the proven offending and the need for general deterrence, and contended that, although the offending preceded the introduction of the mandatory minimum, the seriousness of the offending justified a sentence longer than the minimum required by statute. 86 The Crown also submitted that Mr Ahmadi expressed no remorse for his offending. 87 The defence raised the issue of delay in prosecution of this case as a mitigating circumstance. The Crown contended that delay was not a relevant factor, and Stavrianou J rejected its relevance in his sentencing remarks, as he took the view shared by the Crown that the delay in relation to the prosecution could be adequately explained by the AFP's caseload and the need for prioritisation. 88 In sentencing Mr Ahmadi, Stavrianou J noted that Mr Ahmadi's conduct, including meeting passengers, arranging accommodation for them and transporting them to the boats, was of clear importance in the people smuggling operation. 89 His Honour considered Mr Ahmadi's personal circumstances and history, including his persecution in Iraq, evidence of his good character, his lack of prior convictions, and that he was unlikely to reoffend in the same way. His Honour also noted that it was unlikely Mr _____________________________________________________________________________________ Ahmadi would be granted asylum in Australia or be able re-enter Indonesia, and that he would face danger if he was deported to Iraq at the conclusion of his sentence. 90 Stavrianou J noted the need to send a clear message to others minded to commit people smuggling offences as well as the cost and administrative burden involved in dealing with those brought into Australia by people smuggling ventures. 91 His Honour accepted that Mr Ahmadi was not the primary organiser but a 'middleman', though he nevertheless involved himself knowingly in the smuggling of migrants and his offences were serious. He compared Mr Ahmadi's involvement to that of Mr Achmad Olong who, in contrast to Mr Ahmadi, was a 'prime organiser', but whose sentence took into account his guilty plea and offer of cooperation. 92 Judge Stavrianou recognised the hardship imposed as a result of Ahmadi's imprisonment in a foreign land away from his family in an unfamiliar society and culture. He also noted that Mr Ahmadi had pleaded not guilty but did not penalise him in the sentencing process for the exercise of that right. 93 In relation to each of the two counts of which Mr Ahmadi was found guilty at trial, Stavrianou J considered that five years' imprisonment was appropriate in all the circumstances, and, since the offending in relation to those counts was separate and distinct, the penalties should be cumulative, subject to questions of totality. 94 After considering the two limbs of the totality principle, his Honour found that the overall criminality of Mr Ahmadi's offending would properly be reflected by a total effective sentence of seven-and-a-half years' imprisonment. He then considered the general principles in relation to the determination of an appropriate non-parole period and concluded that the appropriate non-parole period would be four years' imprisonment, and sentenced accordingly. 95
4
Appeal In 2011, Mr Ahmadi appealed against his conviction, arguing that he acted out of necessity and sought to avoid death or serious dangers to the passengers by bringing them to Australia. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected these arguments, and the appeal was quashed. 96
IV OBSERVATIONS
The five cases outlined above reveal a number of observations and common themes. First, what is evident are the strong similarities between offenders. Second, there is great similarity in sentencing, including the usual approach to sentencing under the people smuggling offences, common aggravating and mitigating factors, and the consequences of the mandatory minimum sentence. 
A Offenders
1
The typical offender An image of the typical people smuggling offender prosecuted in Australia crystallises from the cases studied: that of a poor, uneducated Indonesian fisherman, farmer or labourer who, while seeking work, is approached by strangers offering a large amount of money to take a vessel to Australian territory. This observation is shared by many other commentators about people smuggling offenders generally. 98 What emerges is a typical profile that accurately describes those individuals who are commonly targeted by people smuggling organisers. Poor fishermen are particularly vulnerable while out of work, and are easily tempted by the money which the organisers promise. They are targeted because of their lack of sophistication, and are easily duped into undertaking the journey while the organisers remain out of reach to Australian authorities. By the time the boats reach Australian territory, the organisers have already left. For this reason, few have been prosecuted.
2
The role of the offenders and their level of involvement compared to organisers Save for Messrs Ahmadi and Olong, those who have been prosecuted in the cases studied here are those with the most limited involvement in people smuggling organisations. They have not arranged the passengers for the journey. They have no control over the number of passengers they transport to Australia. This is because Australia can only prosecute persons whose offending occurs in Australian territory. In order for organisers to be prosecuted, they must be extradited to Australia, as the prosecutions of Messrs Ahmadi and Olong demonstrate.
It is worth noting how much those two exceptions differ from the typical people smuggling offender. Mr Ahmadi's conduct in organising multiple boats carrying large numbers of passengers was far more significant in the people smuggling operation of
The case summaries considered above are provided for illustrative purposes. The following analysis is based on the total sample of 22 prosecutions during the period studied. 
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127 ____________________________________________________________________________________ which he formed part than that of the typical offender who has no involvement at all until being hired to undertake the final voyage. Mr Olong, unlike the typical poorlyeducated fishermen who are more readily caught and prosecuted, is a universityeducated business owner with interests in the construction, mining and travel industries, who arranged and received payment for the travel of 353 passengers to Australia.
In contrast to the organisers who appear to appreciate the risk of imprisonment in Australia and avoid it by recruiting less sophisticated individuals from isolated fishing villages to undertake the voyage to Australia, the typical offenders who are apprehended in Australian territory rarely understand that their conduct in transporting people to Australia is regarded as serious offending under Australian law. For example, the offenders in R v Pandu & Ors were deliberately targeted because of their lack of sophistication and naïveté as being people who might be relied upon to take the vessel further south beyond Rote Island towards Australia, compliant upon the instructions given to them and not sufficiently aware or sophisticated to appreciate the danger of apprehension by Australian authorities and the consequences of it. Those who were sophisticated and aware of those dangers made sure that they were not on board the vessel when it ventured south of Rote Island. 99
3
The effectiveness of general deterrence Sentencing judges have frequently referred to the seriousness and prevalence of this kind of offending as significant aggravating factors. A related concern is the need for general deterrence: the idea that if other individuals -like the offenders themselveshear of the punishments handed down in Australia, they will refuse to take people to Australia for money. Despite general deterrence being recognised as a significant factor in these cases, a number of judges have expressed misgivings as to its effectiveness in these cases. 100 Given the typical profile of those offenders who are apprehended in Australian territory -and there are several hundred each year -it is easy to see why sentencing judges have frequently questioned the potential for strong mandatory penalties to deter similar individuals from undertaking these ventures. While the offenders' families and villages will likely become aware of the offenders' gaoling in Australia, it is unlikely, as Eaton J noted in R v Pandu & Ors, that the broader Indonesian population will be similarly aware. 101 In R v Dopong & Ors, Barr J explained that the deterrent effect of any sentence imposed will not be great unless the fact of minimum mandatory sentences is widely disseminated throughout the Indonesian archipelago and, in particular, to those poorer and more 
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ remote parts where fishermen and other seamen may be enticed into becoming crew members of vessels which transport people illegally to Australian territory. 102 Fenbury J made a similar comment when sentencing a fisherman convicted of a people smuggling offence:
The law requires me to punish you, so that other fishermen like you do not agree to do things like this for the money. I am sceptical that such a message will get through, especially given the absence of radio and television and matters of that kind, as explained. However, I can't take that into account. I am obliged to apply the theory of general deterrence, irrespective of realities on the ground or in the archipelago of Indonesia. 103 Although they often expected to be caught, the offenders had often been told by organisers that they would be returned to Indonesia after a short time. That these offenders were usually unaware of the mandatory minimum sentence became apparent in a number of cases. In R v Santoso & Ors, for instance, the offenders were advised that they may have to spend some time in Australia, possibly up to three months, when the reality is that they will each have to be sentenced to at least five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. 104 Despite a decade of mandatory minimum sentencing of people smuggling offenders the number of 'suspected illegal entry vessels' to Australia continues to rise. These arrivals have, in turn, overburdened prosecutors so much so that the backlog of cases prompted intervention by the Commonwealth government and pleas from the states for further funding. 105 The facts provide clear evidence that mandatory sentences, along with higher penalties and high rates of incarceration, have had no deterrent effect whatsoever. 106 In the context of people smuggling offences, general deterrence seems an unlikely consequence of the sentences imposed. Given the conditions of isolation and poverty in which the offenders are typically recruited, it is unlikely that the message of deterrence is reaching its intended audience.
B
Sentencing trends 1 Approach to sentencing The majority of those convicted in Australia for their involvement in people smuggling have been sentenced to the mandatory minimum. The approach to sentencing has been similar across jurisdictions, especially since Riley CJ's cogent consideration of the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 107 In that case, he considered the effect of the mandatory minimum sentence on the approach to sentencing. 108 The Crown submitted that the mandatory minimum set a new lower limit for the range of penalties applicable to this type of offence. The mandatory minimum was the base penalty, and reserved for those offences which ordinarily would be given a sentence at the bottom of the range, that is, '[w]here there is both the lowest criminality and the maximum mitigation.' 109 Otherwise, a penalty higher than the mandatory minimum must be imposed. The Crown submitted that the words 'at least' in the mandatory minimum provision indicated the declaration of a starting point. Counsel for the defendants challenged this submission. 110 In determining the appropriate approach to sentencing where the mandatory minimum provision has application, Riley CJ referred to the general sentencing principles applicable to federal offences under the Crimes Act and at common law. His Honour also noted that a number of judges, including Mildren J in R v Tahir & Anor 111 and Kelly J in R v Dokeng, 112 had approached the task of sentencing people smuggling offenders by determining whether a sentence less than the mandatory minimum was appropriate in the circumstances, and then imposed the mandatory minimum as required. 113 Referring to the wording of the mandatory minimum provision and the Explanatory Memorandum to the legislation, Riley CJ concluded that the provision did not reserve the mandatory minimum only for cases at the lowest end of seriousness for relevant offending. That would undermine the general sentencing principles in the Crimes Act and at common law, requiring a clear expression of legislative intention which was not present. 114 Consequently, his Honour took the view that the Court should approach the sentencing of people smuggling offenders according to the usual principles of sentencing, taking into account all the relevant factors. Where the sentence so determined is less than the mandatory minimum, the Court must impose the mandatory minimum as required. 115 The 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ imprisonment is prescribed.' 117 McLure P, with whom Martin CJ and Mazza J agreed, concluded that 'a statutory penalty, like a statutory maximum, is a legislative direction as to the seriousness of the offence.' 118 She acknowledged that 'a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment can create complications for reductions in sentence for mitigatory factors', 119 but went on to note that:
The statutory language makes it unequivocally clear that the Commonwealth Parliament intended to deprive a judicial officer sentencing an offender for a breach of s 232A of both the power to impose a non-custodial sentence and the power to impose a sentence of less than 5 years. 120 The statutory maximum and minimum also dictate the seriousness of the offence for the purpose of s 16A(1) of the Crimes Act. It would be positively inconsistent with the statutory scheme for a sentencing judge to make his or her own assessment as to the 'just and appropriate' sentence ignoring the mandatory minimum or mandatory maximum penalty and then to impose something other than the 'just and appropriate' sentence (whether as to type or length) in order to bring it up to the statutory minimum or down to the statutory maximum, as the case may be. The statutory minimum or statutory maximum penalties are the floor and ceiling respectively within which the sentencing judge has a sentencing discretion to which the general sentencing principles are to be applied. 121
2
Aggravating factors in sentencing (a) Danger to passengers Circumstances of danger to the passengers have been given significant weight as an aggravating factor in sentencing. In R v Hamid, for example, Stevenson J was particularly concerned with the fact that Mr Hamid had placed the safety of his passengers at grave risk in view of the poorly-equipped and poorly-maintained vessel used and his lack of experience and qualification to sail it. 122 Danger to passengers was also noted as an aggravating factor in cases where the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed. 123 
(b)
Role of offenders and level of involvement In Mr Ahmadi's case, it seems his greater involvement in the organisation of people smuggling was given more weight in sentencing him than the sheer number of passengers who came to Australia as the result of his offending. In R v Pot & Ors, Mr Wetangky's role as master of the vessel, and his clear understanding of his conduct and the consequences, meant that special deterrence was a significant consideration in
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In relation to the culpability of the offenders where their role in the people smuggling process was as crew, Crown submissions on sentence have usually relied on McKechnie J's comments in Ilam v Dando:
Notwithstanding their comparatively low level in the criminal hierarchy, nevertheless the appellants performed a pivotal role in the scheme and were vital to its success. It is necessary for courts to deal strongly with the appellants and those like them for the purpose of deterrence to others. 125 Where the offender has been involved as a captain, as in Mr Hasanusi's case, the Crown has often submitted that the offender's culpability was greater than what might be said of a mere crew member with a lesser role. 126 Fenbury J, for instance, took this into consideration in deciding to impose upon Mr Hasanusi a greater sentence than the mandatory minimum. 127
(c)
Not guilty plea In R v Hasanusi, Fenbury J considered that, since the mandatory minimum had been imposed in relation to offenders who had pleaded guilty, it could not be imposed in relation to offenders who had pleaded not guilty, as had Mr Hasanusi. 128 He was sentenced to six-and-a-half years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three and a half years. This approach was not followed in other cases. In R v Pandu & Ors, the offenders were not penalised in the sentencing process for the exercise of their right to plead guilty. Having regard to the factors outlined in s 16A of the Crimes Act, and noting that the governing principle is the imposition of a sentence which is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence, Eaton J rejected the notion that the minimum term could only be imposed in cases where there are optimum mitigating circumstances. 129
(d)
Number of passengers The number of passengers involved in the offending has not tended to result in greater sentences than the statutory minimum. Whereas Mr Hamid brought 14 passengers to Australia and received six years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years, Messrs Tahir and Beny brought 47 people and received only the minimum sentence. Similarly, whereas Mr Pombili brought 10 passengers to Australia and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years, Messrs Pandu, Mau, Kia and Loban brought 74 people and received only the minimum sentence. 130 
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Mitigating factors in sentencing As seen earlier, sentencing judges have frequently referred to the offenders' personal circumstances, such as poverty and poor education, as mitigating factors in sentencing. Early guilty pleas were also taken into account in determining appropriate sentences, to the extent that they indicated remorse and willingness to assist the course of justice. These factors were, however, of limited practical application in these cases because in all cases where the circumstances, including mitigating circumstances, indicated a sentence less than the mandatory minimum according to the usual principles of sentencing, the mandatory minimum has been imposed.
C
The consequences of the mandatory minimum sentence 1 Excessive sentences Another theme emerging from the sentencing remarks in these cases is the frustration sentencing judges have repeatedly expressed with the minimum penalties they are forced by statute to impose on people smuggling offenders. There is considerable proof that as a result of the mandatory minimum greater-than-appropriate sentences have been imposed in many -if not most -cases. In several cases, sentencing judges actually and expressly stated that a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum would have been appropriate for the respective offenders. 131 For example, in R v Nafi, in sentencing a repeat offender who therefore faced a mandatory minimum sentence of eight years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years, 132 Kelly J lamented the fact that the mandatory minimum sentencing provision required her to impose a heavier sentence than would be just in the circumstances:
I am compelled by the legislation to hand down a sentence which is harsher than a just sentence arrived at on the application of longstanding sentencing principles applied by the Courts and which have been applied by those Courts for the protection of society and of the individual. I have no choice.
You will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for eight years commencing on 15 June 2010. I fix a non-parole period of five years. 
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Had it not been for the mandatory minimum sentencing regime … I would have considered an appropriate penalty to have been a term of imprisonment for three years with a nonparole period of 18 months. 133 Her Honour then took the extraordinary step of recommending that the Commonwealth Attorney-General extend mercy to Mr Nafi after he had served 18 months in prison. 134 The Federal Minister for Home Affairs rejected this call on the Attorney-General's behalf, saying that mandatory minimum sentencing had been introduced for people smuggling offences 'to deter people smugglers' because those ventures had resulted in deaths in some cases, and the sentence imposed was appropriate in accordance with the law's intended deterrent effect: 'Parliament has passed laws imposing lengthy mandatory jail terms to deter people smugglers, including greater sentences for repeat offenders. The judge has applied the appropriate sentence.' 135 Given that mandatory minimum sentencing has clearly failed as a deterrent, appeals to general deterrence offer little justification for the overly-harsh sentences imposed as a result.
2
Parity between offenders compromised Although the circumstances of the offending within the class of offenders who have been sentenced to the statutory minimum are similar in general terms, there is great variation in matters such as the safety of the journey, the respective roles of the offenders and the number of passengers involved in the offending. It seems, therefore, that the mandatory minimum has subjugated the principles of parity between offenders in these cases. This was noted by Mildren J in R v Tahir & Anor:
The other dangers of mandatory minimum sentencing, apart from the fact that the Court is required to impose a sentence which is greater than the justice of the case would otherwise require include the fact that principles of parity between offenders has little or no role to play. All offenders that fall within the class will be treated equally no matter what their level of criminality may be. 136 The recent decision in Bahar v The Queen may have restored the parity principle somewhat, noting that:
Where there is a minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment the question for the sentencing is where, having regard to all relevant sentencing factors, the offending falls in the range between the least serious category of offending for which the minimum is appropriate and the worst category of offending for which the maximum is appropriate. 137 It remains to be seen whether the disparity in sentences illustrated in the following examples will be avoided in future cases as a consequence of this decision. 
Federal Law Review
(a)
Danger to passengers The level of danger to passengers varied greatly in the cases of R v Ndolo 138 and R v Pandu & Ors. 139 Mr Ndolo's small wooden fishing vessel was completely unsuitable for the journey to Australia: it had rotted along the planking and carried no lifejackets, and was sinking when found by the Royal Australian Navy. Both the passengers and Mr Ndolo were at risk of drowning. Meanwhile, the vessel crewed by Messrs Pandu, Mau, Kia and Loban was suitable for the purpose, carried plenty of food and water for the passengers and plenty of fuel, and there were more than enough lifejackets on board. It was in good condition when it was intercepted.
Interviews with the passengers in the R v Santoso & Ors case revealed that 'they were treated well by the crew and there was sufficient food and water on the vessel for their needs.' 140 There were lifejackets on board and there was no suggestion that the vessel was other than seaworthy and appropriate for the journey. By way of contrast, in R v Bumiamin, the boat crewed by the offender and his son carried 49 passengers but only five lifejackets, and by the time it was intercepted, after three days and three nights at sea, it had run out of food, water and fuel. 141 Although all of these circumstances were taken into account in sentencing, the offenders in each case received the same sentence: the mandatory minimum.
(b)
The role of the offenders In R v Min & Ors, the three offenders had different roles in the people smuggling venture. Messrs Suryanto and Salas were crew. Mr Suryanto's role on the boat was described as that of a 'general worker': he would tend to passengers or steer the boat from time to time. Mr Salas' role on the boat was to assist with steering and fuel the engine. Mr Min, on the other hand, was described as the captain of the vessel. He was largely in control of, and took responsibility for, both the boat and its passengers. He also did most of the steering. Unlike Messrs Suryanto and Salas, who were first offenders and relatively young, Mr Min was considerably older and, having previously been convicted of a similar offence in Australian waters, more aware of the seriousness of this kind of offending. However, while Mr Min's culpability might otherwise have been reflected in a higher sentence than his co-offenders, all three received the mandatory minimum: Although the situation is different in relation to Mr Min who took on something of a captain's role and who is considerably older than his co-offenders, I am not persuaded that I should sentence him to any greater term than the statutory minimum. … In my view, even given his more serious situation, the significance of the offending is appropriately met by the minimum term. It is still a strong penalty and I would not sentence more than the minimum. 142
(c) The impact of passenger aggression on the offenders' conduct Although the jury rejected the defence of duress in R v Pandu & Ors, Eaton J accepted the plausibility of their claims and was not satisfied that the offenders knew the passengers' intended destination from the outset. He sentenced the offenders on the basis that, in all probability, they brought the passengers to Australia as a consequence of the fact that they were significantly outnumbered by the desperate passengers. But whatever effect the evidence of passenger aggression might have had on their sentences was subjugated by the mandatory minimum sentence: they received the same sentence as offenders who had clearly understood from the outset that their passengers intended to be brought to Australia, and did so without any suggestion of threats from the passengers. 143
Parity in the context of mandatory minimum sentencing It might be argued that the difficulties relating to parity between offenders could be overcome if sentencing judges adopted an approach to sentencing which treated the mandatory minimum as the base penalty, reserved for those offences which ordinarily would be given a sentence at the bottom of the range, and otherwise impose a penalty higher than the mandatory minimum according to varying levels of criminality between offenders. This appears to be the approach advocated by the Supreme Court of Western Australia Court of Appeal in Bahar v The Queen.
While such an approach might resolve issues of parity between offenders, upholding basic principles of fairness and justice in each individual case is rightly regarded as the overriding concern. Accordingly, courts should continue to have regard to general sentencing principles when sentencing people smuggling offenders. This necessarily involves determining a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of each individual case, and in the context of an offence which carries a mandatory minimum sentence, the mandatory minimum should be imposed in each case where a lesser sentence would otherwise be appropriate. This may result in equal sentences among individuals whose offending was not equal in criminality, but it would not do greater justice to impose even higher sentences on some of those individuals if, in all the circumstances, they are deserving of a much lesser sentence than that which the court is required to impose simply for the sake of maintaining parity among them as a class. In the case of people smuggling offenders, it would only serve to do even greater injustice to the vast majority of individuals in that class who are already subjected to harsher punishment than the circumstances of their case would otherwise require. 
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The role of the passengers 1 Threats by passengers The smuggled migrants paid large sums of money to people smuggling organisers to be taken to Australia. While in most cases there was no suggestion that the passengers had any influence over the offending beyond creating the initial demand, it is interesting to note the allegations of threats made by passengers to the offenders in cases such as R v Hasanusi 144 and R v Pandu & Ors 145 where the offenders tried to defend their respective charges on the ground of duress.
Mr Hasanusi argued that he had been hired to take his passengers on a fishing trip but after reaching a fishing spot he was forced to head south toward Christmas Island, fearing that he would be thrown overboard if he did not comply. 146 Counsel for the defendant said that Mr Hasanusi had good reason to be scared because he was outnumbered on his own boat, and did not know he was bringing people to Australia when he followed the persuasive directions of Mr Ahmad al-Abaasi -a passenger who had spent most of the journey next to Mr Hasanusi, and who denied that Mr Hasanusi had been ignorant of their destination. 147 The Crown argued that Mr Hasanusi knew he was supposed to take the passengers to Christmas Island because they wanted to get to Australia to seek asylum.
At trial, passengers gave evidence contrary to Mr Hasanusi's claim. The Court also heard that Customs officials found eight large drums, enough lifejackets for all 38 passengers on board, and enough food and water for the journey, but no fishing nets, rods, or fish. 148 District Court Judge Fenbury noted this during sentencing and concluded that Mr Hasanusi knew what was being planned from the beginning. 149 The defence of duress was rejected by the jury and, after a nine-day trial, Mr Hasanusi was convicted. 150 In R v Pandu & Ors, the offenders gave evidence at trial which raised the defence of duress, claiming that the passengers threatened to push them overboard when they tried to turn the boat around and return to Rote Island, but the passengers gave contrary evidence. Although Judge Eaton noted the plausibility of the offenders' claims, which seemed consistent with the evidence of passenger aggression from Officer Imms at trial, the jury was not persuaded that their offending was committed under duress. 151 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Nevertheless, it seems the commonly held view that passengers are victims of their smugglers, without agency over the journey, is not always accurate, especially considering the finding of the coronial inquest into the SIEV 36 explosion. Here, the coroner found that, notwithstanding the denials made by all surviving passengers on SIEV 36, most of them knew of a plan to start a fire, intending to cripple the boat so that they would be taken off the vessel and taken to Australia. 152
2
Moral culpability and refugee status In most cases the smuggled migrants have been regarded as passive participants in or victims of the smuggling process. By contrast, in some cases, far from feeling exploited by the offenders who brought them to Australia, the passengers seemed grateful. In R v Bumiamin, for example, the passengers gave money to the offender and his son once they saw the Australian surveillance aircraft which detected them flying overhead, because they believed that he and his son deserved it for taking them to Australia. 153 In R v Nafi, Kelly J questioned the moral culpability of offenders in these cases:
By committing the offence to which you have pleaded guilty, you have broken Australian law and must suffer the consequences. However it cannot be said that, apart from the existence of that law, there is any moral culpability in helping to transport willing passengers to a place where they want to go. 154 Almost all of the smuggled migrants involved in the cases studied here were granted permanent protection visas. Yet, in order for a people smuggling prosecution to succeed, it must be shown that the person or persons brought to Australia had no lawful right to come to Australia. 155 In 2011, three cases before the courts in New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Victoria attempted to challenge the common perception that smuggled migrants arriving in Australia have no lawful right to come to Australia by arguing that those arriving in Australia have an entitlement to seek protection and from persecution (even if their arrival may be unlawful or irregular). In R v AMBO, Knox DCJ, however, rejected this argument. 156 Blokland J of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory also refused to entertain the argument further in the case of R v Ahmad. 157 The remaining case of Cth DPP v Jeky Payara before the Victorian Court of Appeal has been largely superseded by the introduction of the Deterring People Smuggling Act 2011 (Cth) in November 2011 through which the Commonwealth government sought to remove any residual doubt that persons arriving in Australia without a valid visa have a lawful right to enter.
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ While the domestic legal position on this point now appears to be settled, questions remain about the moral culpability and criminality of people smugglers who gain no profit and act purely for humanitarian reasons when they bring asylum seekers to Australia, especially in instances in which they are all later granted protection visas. In international law, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants also limits criminal liability for the smuggling of migrants to situations in which the accused acts for a 'financial or other material benefit'. Interpretative and supplementary material to the Protocol emphasise that 'activities of those who provide support to migrants for humanitarian reasons' are to be exempted from criminal liability. 158
E
The impact of the Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth) The Anti-People Smuggling and Other Measures Act 2010 (Cth) has had no practical impact on the course or outcome of the cases studied. The new 'aggravated offence of people smuggling (at least 5 people)' under s 233C of the Migration Act is essentially a remodelling of former s 232A -the offence with which people smuggling offenders were most commonly charged before the 2010 Act came into force.
It is possible that the new 'aggravated offence of people smuggling (exploitation, or danger of death or serious harm etc)' under s 233B of the Migration Act may have an impact on future prosecutions since it requires proof of additional elements, such as recklessness as to the danger of death or serious harm to 'the victim' (presumably the passengers) that arises from the offender's conduct in organising or facilitating bringing non-citizens to Australia. 159 Since this offence carries a higher mandatory minimum sentence of eight years' imprisonment, 160 convictions under s 233B may result in greater sentences for both typical offenders and organisers, given that danger to passengers has frequently been noted in these cases. To date, however, no charges under s 233B of the Migration Act have been laid.
V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Several conclusions, and concomitant recommendations, can be drawn from the analysis. First, the prosecutions so far have essentially resulted in the gaoling of hundreds of poor Indonesian fishermen; those with little or no involvement in people smuggling organisations beyond being recruited to undertake the final journey to Australian territory. Their gaoling has come at considerable financial and human cost but has had no measurable impact on the ongoing operation of people smuggling organisations because these are expendable and plentiful. The Indonesian fishermen are hired labour, recruited because of their desperation and lack of sophistication, willing to take _____________________________________________________________________________________ 160 Ibid s 236B(3)(a).
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139 ____________________________________________________________________________________ on the risk of apprehension by Australian authorities -and the consequences thereof -which those higher up in the organisations are themselves sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate and avoid. Rarely are the poorly-educated offenders who are typically apprehended and prosecuted in Australia similarly aware of Australia's tough penalties for people smuggling offences. Continuing to prosecute these types of offenders in their hundreds as they continue to be intercepted in Australian waters will be costly, time-consuming and indeed ineffective. Given the CDPP's budgetary constraints, it may even be impossible.
If prosecutions are to have any impact on people smuggling ventures to Australia, the focus must be shifted from prosecuting those at the end of the chain to those higher up in the organisations who arrange for, and profit from, those ventures. Between 2008 and June 2011, only two organisers -Messrs Ahmadi and Olong, who were extradited from Indonesia and Thailand respectively -were successfully prosecuted, and one of those, Mr Ahmadi, was at most a 'middleman', not a primary organiser. The gaoling of these offenders, whose conduct in organising multiple boats brought hundreds of passengers to Australia, prevented them from engaging in further people smuggling operations, which had been their intention. Although the typical offenders' conduct in undertaking the final voyage to Australia remains important as the final step in the people smuggling process, they are essentially the 'sacrificial lambs of the people smuggling industry', allowing the organisers to profit from their trade while staying out of the reach of Australian authorities. 161 Leaving questions of the effectiveness of incarceration and recidivism aside, the people smuggling activity which Australia's laws are designed to 'target and deter' could be more effectively disrupted by tracking down the organisers, incapacitating their operations (at least temporarily), and preventing them from continuing the practice of recruiting poor fishermen to take the passengers to Australia. The time, money and effort involved in prosecuting and gaoling hundreds of Indonesian fishermen would be better invested in investigating, extraditing and prosecuting the organisers who put them to the task in the first place.
Second, the prosecutions have not been successful in deterring individuals from engaging in offending of this type. Many impoverished fishermen continue to be targeted and continue to be persuaded by the offer of large sums of money to take passengers to Australia. Australian policymakers should take note of the reservations in relation to the effectiveness of general deterrence in the context of people smuggling offences expressed by some sentencing judges. It is extremely doubtful that the fishermen who are targeted by organisers, who are often illiterate and living in isolated villages, will be aware of, let alone be deterred by, the tough penalties imposed for people smuggling offences. This concern has been expressed in many sentencing remarks and is shared by many experts in the field.
Australia must therefore rely on other means to ensure that Indonesians are aware of Australia's tough penalties for people smuggling offences, particularly those who are at risk of being targeted by organisers. It is worth noting that the Commonwealth government launched an AUD4 million education campaign in Indonesia in 2010 intended to reinforce the message that there are tough penalties for people smuggling offences, but this has been met with a mixture of enthusiasm in some of the villages 
